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Low Carbon Development and Energy Security in Africa 
Chukwumerije Okereke and Tariya Yusuf 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Energy poverty is without a doubt one of the most critical development challenges 
facing African countries today. Out of a population of about a billion, over 547 million 
Africans do not have access to electricity but depend on biomass for their basic energy 
needs (IEA, 2011). Wide scale energy provision is therefore a vital requirement for 
achieving the economic growth and development aspirations of African countries. This 
is more so the case in Sub-Saharan Africa which has the worst poverty in the world 
(EIA, 2011). 
 An equally important challenge facing Africa and the rest of the world is how to 
deal with the problem of climate change which is caused mostly by carbon emissions 
implicated in energy production and consumption. Climate change, through its impact 
on drought, desertification, health and extreme weather events, will exacerbate energy 
poverty in Africa and lead to the further impoverishment of millions (IPCC, 2007a).In 
fact, worsening energy security problems is one the most critical ways in which climate 
change is affecting, and will continue to affect Africa (IPCC, 2011). 
 It is clear therefore that the central development dilemma facing African 
countries and their development partners today is how to address the problem of climate 
change while at the same time pursuing the quest for rapid economic growth and 
universal energy access (IEA, 2011; Sokona et al., 2012). The answer to this dilemma 
lies, to a large degree, in the concept of low carbon development. Africa has plenty of 
cheap renewable resources that can be harnessed to achieve the triple wins of combating 
energy poverty, mitigating climate change and building a low carbon economy. A low 
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carbon development path for Africa carries the promise of multiple co-benefits 
including wider systematic economic resilience, improvement in health condition, 
resource conservation, energy security, reduced foreign exchange need and reductions 
in budget deficit (Bowen and Frankhauser, 2011; Diog and Adow, 2011; Khennas, 
2012). Indeed, the current situation in many African countries where high cost and 
carbon intensive energy is imported through distant transcontinental routes is 
incongruous with reason and basic economics of good development. Pursuing low 
carbon development options has the potential to facilitate economic integration and 
market access among African countries while also helping the continent to contribute its 
quota in helping the global community address the problem of climate change. That 
said, harnessing cheap renewable energy resources in Africa will require appropriate 
capital, national regulatory and investment policy frameworks which may not 
necessarily be easy to achieve. It will also require an equitable distribution of the cost of 
transition to a global low carbon future, a significant aspect of which will have to come 
from substantial North-South financial and technology transfer. 
2 ENERGY POVERTY IN AFRICA 
One of the most significant issues affecting development in Africa is poor access to 
modern energy services. Energy access is critical for meeting many human needs 
including lighting, heating, cooking and communication. It also plays a central role in 
driving productive enterprise such as agriculture, transport and industrial activities. The 
link between energy consumption and economic growth is fairly straightforward and 
well established (Abanda et al., 2012; IEA, 2011; Kanagawa and Nakata, 2007). For 
Africa a key feature of the economic landscape is extremely poor access to and low 
consumption of modern energy. This is despite the fact that Africa has abundant natural 
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resources and is a major contributor to world’s primary energy oil production. Africa 
has about 9 per cent of proven world’s oil reserve and accounts for about 12 per cent of 
total world oil production (IEA, 2011). The continent has about 7 per cent and 6 per 
cent of world’s total gas and coal reserves respectively (BP, 2012). There is also 
abundant natural gas, hydro, solar, biofuel, geothermal and nuclear energy resources.  
Despite these endowments, Africa with its 14 per cent of global population accounts for 
just about 3 per cent of world’s primary energy consumption (BP, 2012). Africa has the 
lowest electrification rate of all the world at 26 per cent of households, with as many as 
547 million people without access to electricity (EIA, 2011). Accordingly, a vast 
proportion of people in Africa depend on traditional biomass fuels from woods, 
agricultural residue and dung for heating and cooking needs. According to IEA reports, 
more than 80 per cent of Sub Saharan African households amounting to 653 million 
people use biomass for cooking. This has had devastating consequences for people and 
the environment. In 2009, more than 1.45 million African lives were lost to household 
pollution caused by inefficient biomass cooking stoves. Fewer people died from malaria 
(IEA, 2011). 
Figure 21.1 Number of People without Electricity (Actual and Projected) by Region 
under Current Policies 
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<sc>Source: World Bank (2009).</sc></figure> 
On current trends less than half of African countries will reach universal access to 
electricity even by 2050. Generation capacity in Africa at 39 MW per million 
population is about one-tenth of the levels found in other low income regions of the 
world. Per capita electricity consumption in Africa (excluding South Africa) averages 
only 124 kilowatt-hours a year, barely one per cent of the consumption typical in high 
income countries (EIA, 2011). This is hardly enough to power one light bulb per person 
for six hours a day. The number of people without electricity is either static or 
increasing because population growth is outstripping the pace at which households are 
being connected. In other words, the annual rate of new connections in Africa (less than 
1 per cent) is not keeping pace with new household formation (1.9 per cent). 
 Within Africa there is wide variation across the sub regions. In the recent past, 
North African countries have made significant advance in dealing with the challenge of 
energy access leaving the problem mostly for sub-Saharan Africa. For example, two out 
of three Sub Saharan African (SSA) households live without electricity. In stark 
contrast, 99 per cent of North African households have electricity supply (IPCC, 2011). 
Only 14 per cent of rural Sub Saharan African (SSA) households are linked to the grid. 
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In comparison, 74 per cent of rural households in Latin America are connected to the 
national grid (Khennas, 2012). 
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa has the lowest consumption of modern 
energy services per capita and this is in spite of the growth of national economies 
witnessed in the last decade or so. For example, per capita consumption of electricity in 
Tanzania is alarmingly low at 65 kWh. This represents only about 2.4 per cent of world 
consumption of 2,751 kWh/per capita (World Bank, 2007).The picture is even grimmer 
for Uganda. Here, only 10 per cent of the population has access to electricity and the per 
capita electricity consumption stands at 44 kWh. Kenya’s per capita electricity 
consumption is comparatively better. It is estimated to be 128 kWh (UNEP, 2012). 
But the picture is not much different even for large countries like Nigeria which is 
widely regarded as one of the two super economies in Africa – the other being South 
Africa. It is estimated that well over 50 per cent of Nigerian’s 152 million population 
does not have access to electricity (Eleri et al., 2011; Okoro and Chikuni, 2007). The 
country, which requires a minimum of 10,000 MW of electricity to meet her energy 
demands currently has a production capacity of just about 3,000 MW. Even though the 
installed capacity of electricity is much greater than 3,000 MW, infrastructure 
utilization is historically very poor and power supply has been epileptic as a result of 
lack of maintenance and unscheduled outages (Oseni, 2012). Investment needed in the 
power sector by Nigeria to generate anything near the quantity needed is estimated at 
USD20 billion (Eleri et al., 2010; Okafor, 2008; Okoro and Chikuni, 2007). 
 While the figures on the number of households connected to the grid provide a 
very good indication of the extent of the problem, they do not tell the whole story. In 
reality, a high percentage of those that are connected to the grid do not have regular 
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access to electricity due to high frequency of blackouts and unstable power supply. The 
World Bank estimates that SSA households experienced between 91 and 105 days of 
blackouts in 2007. There are several instances where communities that have been 
connected to the national grid actually never get to enjoy electric power supply for more 
than three months in a year. Frequent outages and load shedding very much characterize 
the experience of a vast majority of populations and businesses in most sub-Saharan 
African countries (Akinbami et al., 2001). 
 High-cost and unreliable energy services in Africa are a significant drag on 
economic growth and competitiveness in the region. Every year, African households 
and business spend upwards of USD17 billion on fuel based lighting that is often of 
poor quality and hazardous (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank further estimates that 
the economic value of power outages noted above amounts to as much as 2 per cent of 
GDP for countries affected. This figure according to the International Energy Agency 
(see Figure 21.1 above) will continue to grow unless new policies and programmes to 
increase access are implemented. 
 Beyond low electrification, energy poverty challenges in Africa extends to 
inefficient and perilous forms of domestic energy for cooking attributable to a lack of 
modern fuels and clean cookers. Africa currently has the highest energy intensity in the 
world. It uses far more energy for every dollar of gross domestic product (GDP) than 
any other region (IEA, 2011). Africa’s inefficient energy system is characterized by 
energy that is imported, expensive, environmentally unsustainable and dependent on 
coal, oil, wood fuels and natural gas (IPCC, 2011). Massive dependence on imported 
fossil fuels consumes a high portion of Africa’s export earnings. Even Nigeria, the 
region’s largest exporter of crude oil, has to import refined fuels. Fluctuation of oil and 
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gas prices further complicate the task of delivering a secure energy supply in the region. 
Sub Saharan African countries spent 14 per cent of their GDP on fuel imports in 2000 
(EIA, 2011). The focus of delivering centralized conventional electricity through 
thermal power from oil, gas and coal or from large-scale hydropower has not effectively 
delivered either energy access for poor people or the rate of economic growth that sub-
Saharan African countries aim for (Anozie et al., 2007). 
  It is generally accepted that for Africa to achieve the millennium development 
goals (MDG) embodied in sustained economic growth leading to poverty reduction, 
improved standard of living, adequate and reliable energy services have to be made 
available. There is a close association between reducing the need for poorer households 
in developing countries to use biomass for cooking and heating and reaching the MDGs 
on universal primary education, promoting sex equality and the empowerment of 
women and reducing under-five child mortality. A rapidly changing climate will 
however make this task more difficult and further exacerbate energy poverty in Africa 
(Ebohon, 1996). 
3 CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY POVERTY 
The threat of climate change to humankind and to the planet as a whole has gradually 
become more evident. Africa is the continent most vulnerable to climate change impacts 
and the least prepared to deal with its effects (IPCC, 2007b). In fact, Africa is already 
experiencing severe negative impacts of climate change on its people, environment and 
economy (IPCC, 2007b). These include among others, prolonged periods of droughts, 
surface mean temperature increase, reduced agricultural yield, erratic precipitation 
patterns, flooding, ecosystem collapse, malnutrition, spread of tropical diseases and 
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deaths. One of the key ways in which climate change is impacting and will impact 
Africa is in the worsening problem of energy poverty (IPCC, 2011). 
 Climate change and energy poverty has an intimate and complex relationship 
especially in the context of developing regions like Africa. First, it is well known that 
energy provision is a critical requirement for achieving economic growth and 
development. Hence, African countries would need to vastly increase their energy 
generation and consumption in order to reduce poverty, build climate adaptive capacity 
and achieve their development aspirations (Bowen and Frankhauser, 2011; Sokona et 
al., 2012). At the same time, it is well known that the vast proportion (up to 82 per cent) 
of anthropogenic carbon emissions come from energy related activities, including 
electricity generation, transport, building, and industry (IPCC, 2007b). The paradox 
then is that the effort to achieve development, which is crucially needed to escape 
energy poverty and adapt to climate change, could in turn exacerbate the problem of 
climate change leading to poverty (Okereke and Schroder, 2009). Second and related, 
the global aspiration to combat climate change has serious implication for available 
options for energy provisioning in Africa and other developing countries (Ouedraogo, 
2012). 
 One important emerging issue in this regard is the reluctance of many policy 
makers, international aid agencies and environmentalists to consider the full range of 
energy options to meet the energy needs of the poor on the grounds of the need for 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) in the atmosphere (Sanchez, 2011). A famous case was 
the controversy that was generated in 2010 when the World Bank’s sought to lend 
Eskom in South Africa about USD3.75 billion to finance its coal fired power plant 
investment project at Medupi. Then (and as of now) the contention by many NGOs was 
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that the money would have been better used to finance investment in more expensive 
but less carbon intensive renewable energy projects. Sanchez (2011) has also noted that 
in some cases this imperative to achieve development in the context of reducing global 
GHG emissions may result in the use of uncompetitive options to pursue development 
objectives. One example was where a development agency insisted on using renewable 
energy system to pump underground water for drinking and farming even when it would 
have been cheaper to use small diesel engines (Sanchez, 2011). Yet, another scenario 
which has recently gained currency in literature and public policy relates to situations 
where efforts to conserve tropical forests in the context of climate change can deny local 
people access to valuable forest products including wood fuel (Okereke and Dooley, 
2010). 
 Thirdly, climate change, through erratic rainfall, flooding and drought can have 
a direct impact on energy infrastructure with a serious impact on generating capacity. 
This has Already been witnessed in various countries in Africa where a drastic decrease 
in precipitation rates has resulted in severe drought affecting hydropower generation. 
For example Kenya and Ghana, both of which currently rely heavily on large 
hydropower dams, have experienced significant power shortages in recent years due to 
unusually long droughts. Droughts generally lead to massive load shedding and 
decreased electricity supply with the result of huge economic disruptions and losses 
(UNEP, 2012). Excessive flooding on the other hand contributes to a rapid build-up of 
silt in hydropower dams, affecting the amount of water available for electricity 
generation. 
 For developing countries in Africa, the recent food, commodities, and oil price 
shocks – all of which are to some degree a resulting impact of climate change – are 
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already having severe implications for energy access particularly among the poorest. 
The World Bank estimated that the high food, oil, and other commodity prices since 
January 2007 have reduced the gross domestic product of Africa by 3 to 10 per cent. 
The terms-of-trade effects of the combined food and energy price increases are in 
excess of 10 per cent of GDP in more than 15 developing countries, where the room for 
manoeuvre on the macroeconomic front is limited. With millions of Africans living on 
the margin between subsistence and starvation, high food and fuel prices may represent 
a threat to their survival and further heighten energy poverty (UNIDO, 2007). At the 
same time, poverty and high fuel prices can cause people to engage in high profile 
deforestation which might in turn exacerbate climate change. 
 It is important to point out the international justice implication of the above. 
Historically and currently, Africa’s contribution to climate change is very low compared 
to other world regions (IPCC, 2007). This implies that the changing climate in Africa 
and associated energy poverty consequences is very much an issue of global justice and 
equity (Okereke and Schroeder, 2009; Okereke, 2010). Emissions of carbon dioxide in 
Africa represent only a small fraction (3.6 per cent) of the total CO2 emissions per year 
worldwide. In sharp contrast, the contributions from Europe, Latin America and the US 
are 14 per cent, 20 per cent and 14 per cent respectively. Looking forward, Höhne and 
Blok (2005) calculate that by 2050 the OECD will be responsible for about 41.7 per 
cent of global average surface temperature increase due to fossil CO2 while Africa and 
Latin America combined would be responsible for just 17.05 per cent. So both in 
present and future terms, it is the African poor without access to modern energies and 
who have not shared in the benefits of wealth created from the intensive use of energy 
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in the last century that will be the most affected by the impacts of climate change due to 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 In any case, it is clear from the above discussion that nearly all policy measures 
adopted in order to pursue GHG emission reductions will have implications for the 
developing countries’ economies in general and energy provisioning in particular. 
Specifically, investments aimed at reducing GHG emissions in Africa may result in 
reduced expenditure or investments in the energy sector of various African economies 
(UNEP, 2012). As stated, an urgent challenge for Africa in the light of climate change is 
how to achieve growth in the context of growing international mitigation policies and 
the impact these are having on their economies. While, this challenge may appear 
overwhelming at first, there are indications that Africa could turn climate change into 
opportunities by pursuing climate resilient low carbon growth strategies. Such strategies 
will not only enable the continent to manage the development risks associated with 
global climate mitigation efforts, it will also help them to build a diversified and energy 
secure and robust local national economies. 
4 LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
Low carbon development has recently gained currency in academic and policy circles. 
Although fuzzy and poorly defined, the concept has nevertheless captured public 
imagination as a possible means of reconciling the need for economic development and 
climate mitigation. Low carbon development is an imperative for all countries, 
developed and developing alike, if the global aspiration to combat climate change is to 
be achieved. Yet, it is widely recognized that the concept has a particular relevance to 
developing and fast emerging countries where wide scale development initiatives are 
either needed or already taking place (UNEP, 2012). A cardinal feature of the low 
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development paradigm is the notion of decoupling economic growth from carbon 
emission (Mulugetta and Urban, 2010). In practice, this entails embracing low carbon 
designs, structures and industrial activities as central parts of development plans. It also 
requires technological intervention to enhance the energy efficiency of key sectors, 
implements and practices (Bowen and Frankhauser, 2011). 
 Given the abundance of renewable energy sources in Africa, it has been 
suggested that the effort needed to shift production towards cleaner sources may be less 
than can be expected in some other world regions (Abanda et al., 2012). Africa has 
significant hydro power potential which is thought to be in the region of 40,000MW 
(Kalitsi, 2003; Diog and Adow, 2011). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Ethiopia together account for more than 60 per cent of Africa’s hydropower potential. 
Currently, though, only about 20 per cent of this energy source is being utilized. Africa 
has an abundant reserve of natural gas mostly concentrated in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and 
Nigeria. The BP statistical Review (BP 2012) estimates that total proven reserve in 
Africa is 513.2 trillion cubic feet which amounts to about 7 per cent of total world 
reserve. Only a fraction of this is currently being utilized and a vast portion especially in 
Nigeria is being flared. It is in fact estimated that gas flaring accounts for about 12 per 
cent of Nigerian’s annual greenhouse gas emission (Anozie et al., 2007). 
  Estimated geothermal resources on the African continent are around 14GW 
(EIA, 2011). Of this, only 0.6 per cent has been exploited. Currently, the only countries 
using geothermal for electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa are Kenya (127MW) and 
Ethiopia (7MW) (Diog and Adow, 2011). It is thought that some of the most promising 
undeveloped rift systems are the East African Rift in Mozambique, and in Uganda. 
Further research is required to explore possible geothermal potentials in Tanzania, 
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Eritrea and Zambia (Sokona et al., 2012). In 2007, Africa had about 476MW of installed 
wind energy generating capacity; a significantly low proportion of the estimated Sub-
Saharan Africa-wide capacity (93,000MW) (Okoro and Chikuni, 2007). Countries like 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Mauritania and Madagascar among others experience strong wind 
speed which can be readily converted into useful energy. The Sub-Saharan African 
countries are well exposed to sunlight with some of the highest solar intensities in the 
world (Wolde-Rufael, 2009). Northern and southern Africa, particularly the Sahara and 
Kalahari deserts, have particularly promising conditions for concentrated solar plants 
for large-scale power production. Kenya has made good strides towards the utilization 
of solar with more than 30,000 very small solar panels, each producing 12 to 30 watts 
sold annually. It is the world leader in the number of solar power systems installed per 
capita (Abanda et al., 2012). However, to date, only South Africa is generating 
appreciable solar thermal power (0.5MW) in the Sub-Saharan region. Africa has vast 
land mass which can be farmed to produce biofuel in a sustainable manner (Akinbami et 
al., 2001; Amigun et al., 2011) Countries with suitable land include South Africa 
Angola, Zambia and Mozambique among others. 
 In general, with adequate economic, technological and governance infrastructure 
a vast portion of African energy could be produced from clean and low carbon sources. 
This of course is not to suggest that the exploitation of fossil fuel will have to be 
completely abandoned. Nor is it the case that all the energy sources mentioned above do 
not have social and environmental impacts. It is general knowledge that in most cases, 
achieving energy security requires that countries strive to maintain a balance mix of 
energy sources in their portfolio (Sokona et al., 2012). 
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 On the consumption side, low carbon development would require significant 
changes in values especially with respect to consumption behaviour and patterns. For 
Africa then, the goals of low carbon development should be to: (a) achieve energy 
security by significantly enhancing access and reducing reliance on imported fuels; (b) 
contribute to tackling climate change by avoiding high profile emission in the path to 
economic development; (c) achieve diversified, equitable and climate resilient economic 
growth; and (e) realize effective climate adaptation. It is apparent that achieving low 
carbon development would have far reaching implications for governance and 
institutional design. For example the internalization of environmental costs of growth 
would require appropriate pricing of goods and services through a range of policy and 
economic measures targeting both the production and consumption sides. These would 
include national and sub national strategies, and master plans, targets, taxes, subsidies, 
infrastructure and public awareness campaigns. 
5 BENEFIT OF LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT FOR AFRICA 
The concept and practice of low carbon development in Africa implicate a number of 
opportunities and threats. Some of these will resonate with other developing countries 
and some will be specific to Africa with its unique set of resource-base, technical 
capacity, financial situation. One threat of low carbon development to Africa would be 
if the approach impedes economic growth by requiring African countries to bear a 
disproportionate financial burden relative to business as usual development approach 
(discussed further below). Another would be if commitment to low carbon development 
results in unnecessary intrusion into the domestic policy processes by foreign actors. 
That said, there are evidently several reasons while it is in the interest of African 
governments to embrace and pursue low carbon development. Below, we sketch some 
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of the pertinent benefits of low carbon development for Africa. In doing so, we bear in 
mind that Africa is a very diverse continent and that a number of points discussed here 
may not be equally applicable to all the countries within the continent. 
 The first obvious potential benefit of low carbon development is that the 
approach provides an opportunity for African countries to build more resilient and 
diversified economies. Many African countries can make their economies more resilient 
by moving away from conventional single source energy generation towards a more 
diversified energy portfolio. Countries that get their energy from a mix of sources would 
naturally be far less vulnerable than those that rely on single sources. Specifically, low 
carbon development has the potential to help African countries reduce the economic 
vulnerability associated with dependence on oil (Okereke and Tyldesley, 2011). Almost 
one-third of African countries (15) are landlocked with no access to the ocean or seas. 
Many of these are oil importing countries with no proven oil reserve. Examples of such 
landlocked countries include Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda and Uganda. In the absence of 
directly accessible oceans and seas, these countries transport crude and refined oil by 
road over very long distances. Oil is not only an expensive commodity, but one that is 
uniquely prone to dramatic price spikes. The dependence of these countries on imported 
diesel and heavy fuel oil means that their economies are very vulnerable to highly 
fluctuating oil prices. Furthermore, it also implies that the country’s electricity 
generation is firmly tied to insecure oil sources. Oil price spikes directly affect GDP, 
and in oil-dependent countries the effect can be quite high. On average, it is estimated 
that every 10 per cent increase in the oil price results in a global drop in GDP of around 
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0.2 per cent (Owen et al., 2010). This figure is much higher for many African oil 
importing countries. 
 Economic resilience and security can also be enhanced through a range of other 
sectoral measures and policies widely associated with the concept of green growth such 
as low carbon development cities and transport. In urban design, for example, countries 
that opt for dense and compact cities with ample allowances for buses and cycle routes 
are likely to have both economic and social advantages over those that favour extensive 
sprawls with very little and expensive integration. Low carbon houses can save energy 
and help reduce demand on national grid. The main source through which African 
countries contribute to climate change is currently through land use and deforestation 
(IPCC, 2007a). Low carbon development would have to incorporate effective forestry 
and land use management (Bowen and Frankhauser, 2011). This should help to protect 
the natural environment and reduce the vulnerability to flash flooding and destruction 
caused by wide fire. 
 Shifting away from inefficient biomass energy to modern sources would also 
help eradicate poverty and increase economic growth and development. Cleaner energy 
sources can enhance the adaptive capacity of households to climate change with several 
important co-benefits. For example using clean cooking stoves and solar lighting will 
reduced the need to walk large distances to collect firewood. Accordingly, women and 
children who are usually responsible for these tasks will have more time in the day to 
engage in productive activities such as trading, household duties or educational 
activities. Increasing the amount of time for such tasks can support gender equality in 
the home, and the wider socio-economic benefits associated with empowering 
marginalized groups such as improved access to community decision-making processes 
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(Diog and Adow, 2011). Renewable energy can be particularly suitable for rural and 
remote areas where, transmission and distribution of energy generated from fossil fuels 
can be difficult and expensive. Producing renewable energy locally can offer a viable 
alternative. In such situations, renewable energy can also contribute to education, by 
providing electricity to schools. 
 In addition to reducing wider economic vulnerability related to oil price 
fluctuations, the purist of low carbon development can specifically increase African 
countries’ energy security. Many African countries currently depend on very high cost 
imported electricity to meet their power needs (World Bank, 2011). Paradoxically, in 
most cases these countries have abundant renewable sources that could easily be 
harnessed to meet internal energy demands. In fact with good planning and targeted 
investment, these countries could eventually be net energy exporters. However, current 
reliance on externally sourced energy not only implies that scare financial resources are 
spent on the importation of electricity; it also results in huge insecurity in energy 
supply. Energy insecurity is further exacerbated by the fact that supplies in some cases 
come from countries and regions that are politically unstable. Currently, Morocco is the 
largest energy importer in northern Africa. Morocco produces small volumes of oil and 
natural gas from the Essaouira Basin and small amounts of natural gas from the Gharb 
Basin (UNIDO, 2007). However, over 90 per cent of its energy resources come from 
external sources. Much of these imports are transcontinental from Spain via cables laid 
beneath the sea and across the Strait of Gibraltar. It is estimated that the country’s total 
yearly costs for energy imports range from USD1 to 1.5 billion. With the increase in oil 
prices in 2005 the cost of import rose to approximately USD2 billion resulting in a huge 
budget deficit for the country (UNEP, 2012). 
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 Another high energy importing county is Togo which imports as much as 80 per 
cent of its electricity. Out of a total consumption of 726 GWh in 2006, Togo imported 
505 GWh mainly from Ghana with additional imports coming from Nigeria and Ivory 
Coast. Zimbabwe imports up to 400MW of electricity from neighbouring countries 
including Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2008 the country 
experienced wide power cuts because an accumulated debt of about USD100 million 
prevented it from importing larger amounts of electricity. Similarly, also in 2008 
Botswana and Namibia, both of which imports over 50 per cent of its electricity from 
South Africa, were hard hit when an internal energy crisis in South Africa forced Eskom 
to ration its internal supplies and drastically reduce the amount exported to 
neighbouring countries. Drained by five principal rivers including the Zambezi, 
Mozambique is richly endowed with considerable hydropower potential. This has been 
estimated at 12,500 MW, with a corresponding annual energy generation potential of 
60,000 Gwh per year. However, so little of these resources have been exploited. Hence, 
up to 70 per cent of the country still depends on inefficient and unsustainable biomass 
sources for energy (World Energy Outlook, 2012). 
 In general, energy sources such as river basins in Africa are under-utilized, with 
only 20 per cent of the total potential of hydropower plants under use (Kalitsi, 2003; 
World Bank, 2011). Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland, all of which have abundant 
renewable resources, continue to rely on South African Eskom for significant amount of 
their energy needs. Other heavy electricity importing African countries include Egypt, 
Niger, Namibia, Tanzania and the Republic of Benin. 
 It has to be acknowledged that there are instances when it is cheaper for a 
country to import rather than produce its own electricity. Furthermore, some have 
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argued that regional power ‘pooling’ schemes provide the benefit of scale and as such 
could help solve African’s energy challenges (Khennas, 2012). However, cheap 
importation and power pooling should not be seen as substitutes for developing in-
country energy sources, especially when this can be done from abundant renewable and 
sustainable sources. Currently though, far too many African countries are either 
importing from very insecure sources or relying on thermally generated electricity to 
meet their energy needs. 
 However, the high price of oil means that electricity generated using oil-based 
generators is very costly and must be subsidized by the government in order to make it 
accessible to consumers. Even so, many African countries still pay exorbitant prices for 
their electricity. This is unsustainable especially in the context of very limited resources, 
high budget deficit and spiralling external debt. The purist of low carbon development, 
if well planned, could help lower the cost of energy in many African countries. On 1 
July 2008 Namibia and Botswana increased their electricity tariffs by 18.6 per cent and 
20.4 per cent respectively and warned that prices will continue to rise. These increases 
had to do with the need to offset the high cost of electricity importation from South 
Africa. In 2005 the government of Rwanda spent around 8.4 billion RwF 
(USD13,356,000) on fuel for electricity generation which produced 55.2 GWh. This is 
in comparison to 1.5 billion RwF (USD2,385,000) spent on 86 GWh of imported 
electricity from regional hydropower stations. At the same time electricity prices in 
Rwanda rose from 82 RWF (USD0.13) in 2005 to 112 RWF (USD1.78) in 2006 as the 
government struggled to cover the high cost of thermal generation and importation 
(MINIFRA GoR, 2008). 
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 A further incentive to move away from a fossil fuel-based economy is the effect 
that the high level of imports has upon African countries’ trade deficit. Many African 
countries that have huge budget deficits spend large amounts of their foreign exchange 
on oil importation. The current situation, where the import of oil-based fuel for 
electricity generation and transport continually saps scarce foreign reserves, is not 
sustainable for long-term economic development. It has been suggested that in 2008 
Ethiopia spent up to 96 per cent of foreign earnings on oil import. With the 
extraordinary rise in oil prices within this period, it is no wonder that inflation soared to 
as high as 39.4 per cent. Given the very low purchasing power of the African 
population, high electricity costs are far from ideal. In addition, high electricity costs 
discourage industries and businesses wishing to set up in the continent. Utilizing 
domestic renewable energy resources would allow cheaper electricity generation which 
would enable greater electricity access. 
 Lastly, low carbon development will help Africa to prevent what is commonly 
known as carbon lock-in. Carbon lock-in refers to a situation where a high carbon 
infrastructure in a country inhibits drive and options to pursue alternative energy 
sources. Many African countries are currently investing or making serious plans to 
commit large sums of money to develop their energy infrastructure. With the rapid 
economic growth experienced in the last 10 years massive investments are also being 
made or planned in other development infrastructure such as roads, railways, airports, 
and cities. In general, these infrastructures have an average life span of about 40 years 
and buildings can last much longer than this. The implication is that decisions made 
today about the types of power plants, roads, railways and buildings funded or 
constructed will have carbon and energy implications for up to 40 or 50 years at least 
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from now. In other words countries can be ‘locked-in’ to a high carbon or energy 
pathway by making wrong or short-sighted decisions on which development plans they 
adopt. By thinking through future energy and carbon implications of decisions and 
adopting low carbon alternatives, African countries could avoid high carbon lock-in 
while continuing to develop in a sustainable fashion. 
 The World Bank and OECD estimates that a total of USD40.8 billion a year in 
investments is needed for Africa’s power sector, with USD26.72 billion for capital 
expenditure and USD14.08 billion for operations and maintenance (World Bank, 2009). 
For the IEA Africa needs about USD344 billion to create additional electricity capacity, 
upgrade installed equipment and extend transmission and distribution networks to 
households and factories. Countries that are already spending large sums of monies in 
their energy sectors include South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana, and Namibia among 
others. 
 The government of South Africa estimates that just keeping up with growing 
demand from industries and the population will require doubling its generating capacity 
by 2025 at a cost of USD171 billion. Of this, the government plans to spend up to 
USD45 billion by 2013. Between 2000 and 2007 the Nigerian government under 
President Olusegun Obasanjo spent about USD16 billion to revamp its power sector. 
With precious little achieved, the present government has recently pledge to spend 
USD5.7 billion over the next four years on the power sector. Botswana is spending 
USD28 billion to construct an integrated coal mine and power station in Mmamabula 
that could generate 4,800 megawatts (MW) for about 40 years. Zambia is estimated to 
need USD billion to raise power output to meet its expanding demand and Rwanda has 
pledged to invest up to USD 4.74 billion in its energy sector between now and 2017. 
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 A quick look at energy development strategy of many African countries however 
indicates that for the most part these countries are investing or planning to invest their 
money on conventional hydrocarbon-based generating facilities rather than on cutting 
edge low carbon technologies. This is, in a sense, very understandable as these countries 
are concerned about the high cost of low carbon technologies especially given the 
difficulty of raising finance from the public and private sector. Perhaps the most recent 
high-profile example is the 4,800MW Medupi coal-fired power plant that is being 
constructed by the South African government with financial assistance from the World 
Bank. When the plans by the South African government to borrow about USD3.75 
billion came to light, many green NGOs argued that the money should have been better 
spent towards generating from renewable sources such as wind and solar. However, 
South Africa argued that investing in renewable sources will cost much more and 
generate fare less electricity than a coal power plant. Given the urgent need to increase 
supply to support rising demand and economic growth, the country felt it had little 
option than to commit to building the high carbon power plant. 
<a>6 CHALLENGES TO LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT AND ENERGY 
SECURITY IN AFRICA 
Achieving low carbon development and energy security in Africa will not be easy. The 
pursuit of low carbon growth poses a challenge for countries all over the world and 
there are reasons to believe that these challenges may be particularly acute for African 
countries. One of the most obvious and frequently cited obstacles that may hinder 
Africa from harnessing the advantages of green growth is lack of finance. Although 
technological advances that help lower their costs are being made, clean energy in most 
cases still costs far more than its conventional alternatives. For example, figures from 
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the 2012 report of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the US Department 
of Energy (DOE) suggest that the average capital cost of energy from conventional coal, 
solar thermal and offshore wind are USD65.8 million MW/h, USD204.7 million MW/h 
and USD300.6 million MW/h. Even when one factors in the operation and maintenance, 
fuel costs and transmission investment, all of which are in most cases lower for clean 
energy, the average total system costs of renewable technologies are still mostly higher 
than the conventional sources. Generating from renewable sources may also have 
benefits such as those related to health. However, their costs remain mostly ‘front-
loaded relative to their benefits’ (Bowen and Frankhauser, 2011, 149). 
 There are of course a number of renewable options such as low head hydro and 
biomass that are economically competitive especially as a means of supply to sparsely 
populated rural communities, but even these may require technical assistance and the 
correction of market failures which may be difficult for many African countries to 
deliver. Moreover, even when there are strong long-term economic and environmental 
arguments for investing in clean energy, the notion might persist that in taking a low 
carbon route, Africans are paying a price imposed on them by foreign governments 
whose main interest is global climate mitigation. These are some of the main reasons 
why the provision of adequate and predictable finance and technical assistance by 
developed countries are absolutely essential in encouraging African countries to 
embrace low carbon growth paths. 
 Unfortunately, it is well known that current financial and technical support from 
the developed countries is far too low compared to what is needed. The Global 
Environmental Facility established in 1991 serves as the main operating entity for the 
international climate regime and has the longest track record on environmental funding. 
728 
 
However, it received just over USD1 billion during its fourth replenishment period 
(2006–2010). Similarly the other two funding sources within the convention, the Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) (both 
also administered by GEF), have only disbursed USD108 million and USD80 million 
respectively since their inception in 2002 (Sokona et al., 2012). These figures represent 
a tiny fraction of what is needed to help developing countries adequately invest in low 
carbon development and energy security. To compound matters, African countries, 
mainly because of poor capacity and their position in the global economic structure, 
have not been the favourites in attracting multilateral and private sector climate finance. 
Fast-start finance agreed at Copenhagen in 2010 was just USD10 billion per year up 
until the end of this year; with a long-term goal of mobilizing USD100 billion per year 
by 2020. And while this may not be enough, it is doubtful that the global North will 
commit the amount of money required to meet this ambition. 
 In addition to the general lack of climate funding, there is also an indication that 
availability of finance is not linked to what is actually needed or to where it is most 
urgently needed (Diog and Adow, 2011). Rather, climate finance delivered has reflected 
the political preferences of developed countries, and the ‘low-hanging fruits’ 
opportunities offered by the higher emitting, middle income countries, particularly India 
and China (Diog and Adow, 2011). It is therefore imperative that adequate and 
predictable funding is available in order to incentivize low carbon development in 
Africa. A good illustration of the problem of lack of finance can be found in Rwanda. 
The Government of Rwanda has ambitious plans to develop its energy sector as a wider 
plan for achieving low carbon and climate resilient development. Up to 90 per cent of 
Rwandans have no access to electricity. Of the 20 per cent living in urban areas only 
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about 25 per cent are connected to the national grid. And at about 44 kWh per capita per 
year Rwandan electricity consumption per capita is among the lowest in the world. The 
Energy Sector National Policy and Strategy set out the aim of installing a total of 
1,000MW electricity generation capacity by 2017 (up from 85MW at present). This 
expansion of electricity generation capacity is planned to come from four main sources; 
geothermal (310MW), hydropower (300MW), methane (300MW) and peat (100MW). It 
is planned that a rapid national grid expansion programme will accompany this increase 
in generation capacity. The grid will be extended by 2,100 km (700 km of HV and 
1,400 of MV), increasing the number of connections to 1,200,000 up from 175,000 
today (Safari, 2010). The aim of this extension is to enable 50 per cent of the population 
access to the national grid by 2017. In addition, by 2017 the GoR plans to ensure that all 
health centres, local administration offices and all schools in the country have access to 
electricity, either off or on grid (Eggoh et al., 2011). The increase in access to electricity 
is intended to provide alternatives to traditional sources of energy, hopefully reducing 
the dependence upon biomass and limiting risks of deforestation. The target is to reduce 
the use of biomass from 86 per cent of primary energy use today to 65 per cent in 2017. 
This will also be accompanied by efficiency measures such as improved cooking stoves. 
Alternatives such as biogas will also be introduced. 
 The big challenge however is that the energy generation and access plan is 
estimated to cost around USD5 billion. To put this in context, the entire budget for 
Rwanda including both recurrent and domestic spending for the fiscal year 2009/10 was 
USD1 billion. And of this figure, donor support accounted for about 41 per cent. One 
can immediately see the difficulty faced by the country in overcoming the problem of 
energy access which is fundamental to economic growth. 
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 While lack of international climate finance is a major factor limiting low carbon 
energy secure future for Africa, it is important to stress that this is only one side of the 
coin. The other is widespread lack of technical capacity and good governance in Africa. 
There is an abject paucity of technical skills needed to design and implement 
conventional development projects, let alone cutting edge low emission growth plans 
(Okereke and Tyldesley, 2011). The majority of African countries have critical capacity 
gaps in all the key phases involved in the low carbon development delivery chain from 
conception, through design and planning to implementation. Many governmental 
ministries have just one or two experts who have to draft or vet project proposals, study 
sophisticated engineering designs, conduct rigorous economic analysis, negotiate 
complex legal contracts and undertake the other several highly technical tasks 
associated with policy development and implementation. 
 Closely related to, and perhaps the primary reason for poverty, is the problem of 
poor governance. Decades of poor governance in Africa have resulted in 
underinvestment in education, human capital, and research and technology 
development. Similarly, there is widespread underinvestment in fundamental 
development infrastructure upon which to leverage green growth policies. Lack of 
infrastructure, poor institutions and widespread corruption provide the platform for the 
dominance of the energy market by monopolies which are often controlled by a few 
elites. These monopolies are usually not interested in widening energy access but have 
been known to actively block the market entry of green energy providers. The result is 
lack of private capital, pervasive market failure, chaotic regulatory environment and 
usually high costs for investment in clean energy. To achieve energy security and low 
carbon development, then, African countries will need to undergo radical governance 
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reforms aimed inter alia at minimizing corruption, increasing technical and human 
capacity, correcting market failure and boosting investment in infrastructure and 
technology development. 
 
7 CONCLUSION 
The concept of low carbon development offers plenty of prospects for Africa to grow its 
economy, achieve energy security while contributing its own quota in the global effort 
to fight climate change. Given the critical importance of modern energy to wellbeing 
and to economic development in general, achieving universal energy access should 
definitely be the priority of African countries. However, there is no reason why Africa 
must follow the development path towed by the West with its negative impact on 
environment and humankind. Rather emphasis should be on harnessing the abundant 
renewable natural resources present all across the continent. However achieving low 
carbon development would require the massive upscale of climate and clean energy 
finance, large-scale investment in technology and human capacity as well as radical 
governance reforms. Africa has the right to expect significant financial assistance from 
the international community to offset the additional cost associated with low carbon 
development. It currently makes an insignificant contribution to the global carbon pool 
while bearing the brunt of much of the negative impact of climate change. Indeed, the 
World Bank (2010) calculates that scaling up access to electricity access in Africa 
would add only a small fraction of projected global emissions from 1.5 per cent of 
global annual energy related CO2 emissions today to 2–3 per cent of global emissions 
by 2050. Provisions of much needed basic energy services to the poor would therefore 
contribute only 1 per cent to global CO2 emissions (World Bank, 2011).The poor 
732 
 
deserves basic energy services like everyone else. Moreover, they have made little 
contributions to climate change. Global justice and equity is therefore at the heart of the 
debate about climate change, energy security and climate mitigation. 
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